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On 15 December 2001 the European Council adopted
the Laeken Declaration, establishing a “Convention on
the Future of Europe” which is to meet in advance of the
next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). This
Convention – which will bring together European and
national parliamentarians with representatives of
national governments and of the European Commission,
and include candidate countries as well as present
Member States – is to debate a series of questions about
the Union’s constitutional framework and fundamental
political system.
It is a bold step which has raised considerable
expectations, as well as a few eyebrows: will such a huge
and diverse body really be able to come up with specific
and generally-acceptable answers? Yet it is remarkable
in itself that such a comprehensive agenda should have
been accepted by the Heads of State or Government of
all 15 Member States. And there is little doubt that the
Convention, an instrument that is not foreseen in the
Treaty, represents an important innovation in how the
Union goes about changing itself.
In the last ten years, the first decade of post-Cold War
Europe, one IGC has led to another as the EU has tried
simultaneously to manage the radical deepening of
integration from a single market through a single
currency and common security arrangements towards
political union; to prepare its institutions and policies
for an enlargement from 12 members to 15 and then 25
or more; and to deal with the uncomfortable fact that the
support of its citizens cannot be taken for granted, as
shown by the Danish “No” to Maastricht in 1992 and the
Irish “No” to Nice in 2001.
In this process, each IGC has explicitly foreseen the
next one. The Maastricht Treaty had to be concluded in
haste amid the accelerated historical events of the time.
It was thus not only a second best or a lesser evil which
all could agree should be revisited. It was also part of the
bargain to postpone some questions in order to reach a
deal. The Treaty on European Union thus committed the
parties to come back in 1996 to review some of the
arrangements agreed, although the agenda quickly had
to be broadened to include the demands of enlargement
and the problems of legitimacy. The ensuing 1996-
1997 IGC, however, failed to resolve the institutional
issues which were considered indispensable prerequisites
for enlargement. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was thus
accompanied by a Protocol committing the Union to
deal with these “left-overs” and to carry out a broader
review of its institutional system before enlargement
involving more than five countries took place. The
result was another IGC, formally opened in February
2000, which produced the Nice Treaty in December that
year. And yet again, the conclusions were accompanied
by an agreement to come back and do better next time.
Another IGC would be called in 2004 to address, at a
minimum, four outstanding issues: the delimitation of
competences between the Union and the Member States,
the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the role
of national parliaments and simplification of the treaties.
Yet the Declaration on the Future of the Union which
was attached to the Treaty of Nice was at least as
significant with regard to the process as to the content
of the next steps, calling for a “broad and open debate”
involving not only governments but national
parliaments and civil society. The Laeken Declaration,
one year later, would define the modalities of this
debate.
This new interest in involving the public may partly
have been a general reaction to the alarmingly low level
of public support indicated by polls. According to
Eurobarometer, on average across the whole Union,
barely half of citizens could say positively that the
European Union was a good thing. This was not only
regrettable but could (and did!) have practical
consequences when it came to ratification.
There seems also to have been a broad consensus that
the purely diplomatic approach to agreeing changes
had run out of steam. The process of hopping from treaty
to treaty can certainly be seen as a reflection of the step-
by-step approach to integration which has characterised
European integration since the days of Monnet and
Schuman. However, it also seemed to many involved to
be producing “diminishing returns” (that is, it was
progressively taking more and more time and effort to
reach agreements) as well as a negative image for the
public, while contributing to the quite undemocratic
complexity of the Union’s constitutional framework.
Finally, there was the shining example of the Convention
which successfully drafted a Charter of Fundamental
Rights in parallel to the 2000 IGC. In contrast to the
purely intergovernmental negotiations over institutional
reform and the final bad-tempered wranglings behind
closed doors in the early hours at Nice, the Convention
had brought together representatives of national
governments and national parliaments, as well as of the
European Commission and the European Parliament,
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and had worked on the basis of transparency, consultation
and consensus.
At least for the next time, there can be no substitute
for an IGC. Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union
is quite clear that only the governments of the Member
States have the power to change the treaties. However,
could not the Convention model be a new and more
effective way of preparing the decisions to be taken?
The Report presented by the Swedish Presidency in
June 20011 therefore outlined not only the option of a
group of government representatives (like the Reflection
Group which met in advance of the 1996-1997 IGC) and
that of a small group of wise persons, but also the idea
of  “a broad and open preparatory forum” for the next
IGC. This last option was strongly supported by the
upcoming Belgian Presidency, the other two Benelux
countries2 and a number of other Member States, as well
as the European Parliament3 and the Commission. Not
all agreed. The United Kingdom was the strongest
opponent of the idea, fearing that this would tie the
hands of the IGC. Even after the decision was taken, the
UK pressed for a long period of digestion between the
end of the Convention and the beginning of the IGC in
order to weaken any direct link between the two.
Although in the end there was a clear decision of the
European Council to go ahead with the Convention, it
is clear that hopes and expectations differ widely, and
the structure of the Convention may in fact not make it
easy to come up with clear and consensual results.
Moreover, it is evident that the Convention will not
be acting in isolation. In the last few years, a new
political debate has emerged over the constitutional
framework of Europe and the roles of the European
institutions. This has been fed mainly by speeches given
by national political leaders – chiefly from the big
Member States – starting with German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer in May 2000, followed by French
President Jacques Chirac in June and UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair in October. And just as the Convention was
coming into being in the last days of February 2002, new
proposals were jointly presented by the British and
German Governments with a view to strengthening both
transparency and the role of the Council in the legislative
process. This predictably provoked open concerns in
some quarters about the influence which national
governments, and especially the big Member States,
would exert over the Convention’s proceedings.
The Convention
The composition of the Convention generally follows
that of the body which drafted the Charter of Fundamental
Rights: one representative of each government, two
members of each national parliament, 16 members of the
European Parliament, and two Commission re-
presentatives.4 However, the candidate countries –
including Turkey – will now participate, with the same
representation as the current Member States “and will be
able to take part in the proceedings without, however,
being able to prevent any consensus which may emerge
among the Member States”. There will be 13 observers:
three representatives of the Economic and Social
Committee and three of the European social partners,5
six from the Committee of the Regions; and the European
Ombudsman. This means that there will be a total
number of 105 full members, of whom two-thirds will be
parliamentarians. At the time of writing it had not been
agreed what role would be played by the Observers or by
the alternate members.6
The Laeken Declaration also appointed the
Chairman, former French President Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, and two Vice-Chairmen, former Italian Prime
Minister Guiliano Amato and former Belgian Prime
Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene. It was agreed that the
Praesidium should have 12 members: the Chairman and
Vice-Chairmen; two representatives of the European
Parliament,7 the two representatives of the European
Commission, two representatives of the national
parliaments,8 and the governmental representatives of
the three Member States which will hold the Presidency
of the Council during the life of the Convention, i.e.
Spain, Denmark and Greece.9
The Declaration is clear as to the leading role of the
Praesidium and the Chairman, who “will pave the way
for the opening of the Convention’s proceedings by
drawing conclusions from the public debate. The
Praesidium will serve to lend impetus and will provide
the Convention with an initial working basis.” In order
to involve citizens, “a Forum will be opened for
organisations representing civil society”. The
Declaration gives the impression that this will also be
very much in the hands of the Praesidium: “a structured
network of organisations receiving information on the
Convention’s proceedings. Their contributions will
serve as input into the debate. Such organisations may
be heard or consulted on specific topics in accordance
with arrangements to be established by the Praesidium.”
It was subsequently agreed that Vice-Chairman Dehaene
would have special responsibility for the Convention’s
interaction with civil society.
At the time of writing, the Rules of Procedure had not
been finalised, although it was already clear that working
groups will be created to deal with particular issues. The
Declaration leaves open the nature of the final document
to be produced (for which Vice-Chairman Amato will
have special responsibility). This “may comprise either
different options, indicating the degree of support which
they received, or recommendations if consensus is
achieved.” It does stress, however, that this should not
tie the hands of the Member States. “Together with the
outcome of national debates on the future of the Union,
the final document will provide a starting point for
discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which
will take the ultimate decisions.” The Convention should
conclude by June 2003.
The Laeken Agenda
The four sections included under the heading of
“Challenges and Reforms in a Renewed Union” modify,
reorganise and add to the points in the Nice Declaration.
A total of just over 50 questions are formulated. Despite4 Eipascope 2002/1 http://www.eipa.nl
the emphasis in the first part on the Union’s role in a
globalised world, there are only fleeting references to
enhancing the coherence of European foreign policy,
reinforcing synergy between the High Representative
and the Commissioner responsible for external relations,
and possibly extending the external representation of
the Union in international fora.
Most questions concern the internal workings of the
Union, grouped in four sections:
• clarification of the principles for deciding who does
what, and possible reorganisation of competences
between EU and Member States (and regions);
• simplification of the Union’s instruments;
• how to increase “democracy, transparency and
efficiency” in the EU; and
• constitutionalisation of the Union in the process of
simplification of the Treaties and incorporation of
the Charter on Fundamental Rights.
It is in itself a very significant step that the Heads of State
or Government should have agreed to a such a broad
agenda which includes fundamental questions about
the political organisation and nature of the Union. Yet
only a few new points are introduced: for example, the
idea that the President of the European Commission
could be appointed by the European Parliament or even
directly elected, as means to increase the authority of the
Commission; the possible introduction of a European
electoral constituency as a means to strengthen the
credibility of the Parliament; and the need to review the
rotating Presidency. Most of the questions posed have
been high on the agenda since the 1990s or before, and
nothing is really added in the Declaration which makes
it any easier to solve the problems.
Among the many questions posed with regard to
democracy, transparency and efficiency, for example,
the role of national parliaments has been debated
constantly since the late 1980s. A Declaration was
attached to the Maastricht Treaty in which governments
undertake to ensure that national parliaments have
adequate time to scrutinise Commission proposals, as
well as encouraging contacts between the national
parliaments and the European Parliament. The Treaty of
Amsterdam included a Protocol obliging the
governments of the Member States to ensure that their
parliaments received proposals for EU legislation at
least six weeks before the Council was scheduled to act;
and encouraging COSAC10 to play an active role,
particularly with a view to ensuring respect for
subsidiarity. The possibility of a new institution is
mentioned in the Laeken Declaration, but it is not easy
to see what more could be done to give the national
parliaments an institutionalised role at European level.
The idea of a permanent chamber of national parliaments
has been pushed by Tony Blair (and before him, most
notably, by various French politicians), although his
public proposals were not clear as to the specific role
such a body should play, and the British Government
has seemed more recently to back away from this idea.11
Any idea of a chamber working on a day-to-day basis in
parallel to the European Parliament, however, still faces
the strong counter-arguments that this would only create
further institutional complexity and further undermine
the EP’s credibility.
Likewise, the issue of the distribution of competences
and the application of the principle of subsidiarity has
been at the centre of the European debate since before
the Maastricht Treaty (quite apart from being a basic
question in any integration project). The Laeken
Declaration sensibly breaks down the issue into two
parts. It first asks whether it is possible to make “a clearer
distinction between three types of competence: the
exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of
the Member States and the shared competence of the
Union and the Member States”. It then asks whether
there needs to be an adjustment of who does what – for
example, should the Union do more in the areas of
defence or police cooperation, or should some things be
more clearly left to the Member States or the regions?
The Declaration stresses that a reorganisation “can lead
both to restoring tasks to the Member States and to
assigning new missions to the Union”. Yet nothing new
is said about how to deal with these challenges and
dilemmas. How can one reconcile a fixing of
competences with the maintenance of dynamism? What
about the fact that competences are mostly shared, and
that in practice the division of tasks has been according
to function rather than by sector? Even where there may
be exclusive legislative competence, in other words,
almost all the responsibility for policy implementation
remains in the hands of the Member States or sub-state
authorities. Can one, in practice, really envisage a clear
separation of who will “do” what?
Rather different problems arise with regard to the
very un-simple question of “simplification”. The Laeken
Declaration sensibly divides the issue into two parts. A
short section on “Simplification of the Union’s
instruments” thus raises the issues of reducing the number
and clarifying the nature of the various legislative
instruments, as well as clarifying the areas in which
“non-enforceable” methods such as “open coordination”
are appropriate. There is a wide consensus that something
must be done to deal with the unnecessary complexity
and confusing nomenclature in these respects, and many
would argue that this could be done without major
constitutional implications. Simplification of the
treaties, on the other hand, is rightly put into a quite
separate section entitled “Towards a Constitution for
European citizens”, along with the status of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights. Again, there is a wide consensus
as to the desirability of sorting out the present
constitutional mess of having Treaties which change
Treaties within other Treaties, but it is also clear that it
is very hard to reorganise the Treaties without any
change in the law.
As the Laeken Declaration says, “The question
ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and
reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the
adoption of a constitutional text in the Union” (emphasis
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of Justice has already ruled that the treaties are a
“constitutional charter” for the Union. Does the
Declaration actually commit anyone to go further?
Expectations and Prospects
In the run-up to Nice, the European Parliament openly
urged that “the IGC should amend the procedure for the
revision of the Treaties with a view to the ‘consti-
tutionalisation’ of the Treaties and the democratisation
of the revision process by means of the introduction of
a power of joint participation in decision-making for the
institution which represents the States and that which
represents Union citizens.”12 More recently the EP has
proclaimed itself in favour of “the emergence – even at
this stage through the Convention established by the
Laeken European Council – of a constituent power
exercised jointly by the national parliaments, the
Commission, the European Parliament and the
governments of the Member States, which would not
only allow effective preparation of reform of the treaties
but would also give European integration efforts greater
legitimacy and would thus mark a new chapter in the role
of parliaments in European integration by introducing
a major institutional innovation.”13
Those who want a full European Constitution will
obviously judge the results and the impact of the
Convention by the extent to which it contributes to such
formal constitutionalisation, but those who hope for a
modern European equivalent of Philadelphia –
apparently including Mr Giscard D’Estaing – are likely
to be disappointed. To be sure, there can be unexpected
outcomes. When the members of the US Convention met
in Philadelphia in May 1787, they had only been given
a mandate to introduce amendments to the original
Articles of Confederation, but they ultimately produced
an entirely new document. The new Constitution was
controversial and led to fierce debates, but was ultimately
adopted and has survived to become an important
symbol of unity. However, although the American states
at the time were indeed less integrated than the EU
today, for many reasons it will not be simple for the
members of the Laeken Convention to come up with a
similarly bold proposal, quite apart from convincing the
Member States to put it into practice. The US Founding
Fathers did nothing less than create a new system of
national government. It is doubtful whether most
members of the Convention will be willing to go that far,
and also whether there is sufficient popular support to
approve any such radical changes.
Yet it would be wrong to reduce evaluations of the
Convention to such terms. There are two kinds of hopes
and expectations for the Convention which are quite
independent of any such ambitions, and are just as
important in the long term. These are a) that it may prove
a more effective as well as democratic way of preparing
major decisions, both by building consensus between
decision-makers and by involving in advance those
actors who will have to ratify the decisions which are
taken; and b) that it may afford an opportunity for the
public to become more involved in the European process
more generally (which will also require, of course, that
individual governments and parliaments themselves
take the necessary initiatives).
In this context it is worth asking what consensus-
building actually means. In particular, does it necessarily
mean to try to produce a single set of concrete proposals,
or even the text of a Draft Constitution, albeit with
minority opinions? Even if such a text can be produced,
there is no guarantee as to how the subsequent IGC will
act, and there may be costs. Indeed, there may be a certain
trade-off between the degree of concreteness and unicity
which is pursued in the proposals to come out of the
Convention, on the one hand, and the degree of
involvement in the Convention’s proceedings on the
part of the parliamentarians and the public who are to
ratify the outcome of the next IGC, on the other.
The Nice Declaration on the Future of the Union
seemed to open up an unprecedented pause in the
integration process, an opportunity for the public to
“catch up” with what has happened and for their
representatives, at least, to have more of a chance to
influence with some degree of calm what is to happen
next. There would be a starting period of one year (2001)
for national debates to be launched. There would then
be a period of two years (2002 and 2003) for some form
of structured debate at European level. And only then,
in 2004 – and with the equal participation of the new
Member States – there would be a formal agreement
between the governments as to the constitutional future
of this very new European Union.
Already the time horizons are under pressure, as
Member States hope to manage the agenda so that their
country can start or end the IGC, and other actors try to
time things so as to guarantee that everything will be
over before the next European elections in June 2004.
This only accentuates concerns about the working
methods of the Convention – mainly the fear that the
Praesidium, under the double pressures of time and
ambition (and perhaps also the personal style of the
Chairman), may give less attention than is merited to the
process of actually bringing in the European parlia-
mentarians and the European public, in order to get on
with drafting a “Constitution for European Citizens”.
These considerations, of course, apply all the more in the
case of the candidate countries.
Whatever the final document looks like, and even if
there is a significant gap between the end of the
Convention and the beginning of the IGC, it will not be
possible to ignore the outcome of a Convention chaired
by a former President flanked by two former Prime
Ministers, with the participation of all national
governments and parliaments as well as the European
Parliament and Commission. After all, it is the parliaments
which will in most cases have the power to ratify, or not,
the results of the IGC. Even if there will not be a single
document, the Convention can make a tremendous
contribution to the stability and legitimacy of European
integration by promoting general agreement and public
understanding as to the basic principles according to which
we all want the European Union to operate and to evolve.6 Eipascope 2002/1 http://www.eipa.nl
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1 ‘Report on the Debate on the Future of the European Union’,
Brussels, 8 June 2001.
2 On 22 June 2001, the Benelux countries had put forward a
memorandum on the future of Europe in which they argue that
the IGC should be prepared by a forum chaired by a leading
political figure and composed of representatives of national
parliaments, the EP, the European Commission’s, the
governments of the Member States (‘Benelux Memorandum
on the Future of Europe’, 22 June 2001).
3 ‘European Parliament Resolution on the Treaty of Nice and
the Future of the European Union’, 31 May 2001.
4 There was only one Commission representative in the
previous Convention. The two Commissioners now will be
Michel Barnier, who has had personal responsibility for
IGCs and institutional reform in the Prodi Commission, and
Antonio Vitorino, who was the Commission’s representative
in the Convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
5 The European social partners are the two main bodies
representing employers´ organisations at European level (the
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of
Europe - UNICE, and the European Centre of Enterprises
with Public Participation  - CEEP) and the European Trade
Union Confederation - ETUC.
6 The European Parliament proposed in the run-up to the
Convention that the alternates should play a full role in the
proceedings in all respects except voting, as in EP Committees,
which would mean that plenary sessions would actively
involve some 200 people.
7 The two representatives of the European Parliament in the
Praesidium are Iñigo Méndez de Vigo and Klaus Hänsch.
8 The first meeting of the representatives of the national
parliaments in Brussels on 22 February agreed, on the basis
of an understanding reached between the two major political
groups, that these would be Gisela Stuart, the UK Labour
representative, and former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton.
9 It is striking that the Spanish and Greek Governments have
named Members of the European Parliament as their
representatives.
10 COSAC is the conference of specialised European affairs
Committees of the EU national parliaments and the European
Parliament, which has met every six months since 1989 to
discuss particular aspects of the EU’s evolution.
11 The UK House of Lords, as well as the European Parliament,
has recently pronounced itself against such proposals for a
second chamber.
12 EP Resolution on the constitutionalisation of the Treaties
adopted in October 2000 (2000/2160(INI)).
13 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs,
‘Report on relations between the European Parliament and
the national parliaments in European integration’, A5-0023/
2002, 23 January 2002. p.8, emphasis added. 